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OVERVIEW — This issue brief examines the sources of variation in Medicare
payment and costs across different geographic areas and different sites of care.
It discusses payment policies that address variation in the cost of providing
care, such as input price adjustments and special payments to hospitals. It
also considers differences due to beneficiaries’ health status and physicians’
practice patterns. Finally, it explores policy options to address Medicare geo-
graphic variation.
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The Geography of Medicare:
Explaining Differences in
Payment and Costs
As a national program, Medicare serves a large and diverse population.
Across the United States, the utilization, costs, and quality of health care
vary widely. Much of this variation seems to be specific to certain regions
of the country, where the differences in what Medicare pays per benefi-
ciary can be more than twofold among states or even among counties
within the same state.
Geographic variations in Medicare spending are as old as the program
itself, although policymakers have recently begun to question the equity
of wide discrepancies in a national program. In 2000, spending per ben-
eficiary in the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program ranged from
about $3,500 in Santa Fe, New Mexico, to $5,360 in Las Vegas, Nevada, to
almost $9,200 in Miami, Florida.1
Because Medicare makes no real distinction between good and poor health
care when paying for services, it can be difficult to sort out just exactly
what the program receives for increased spending. Policymakers in low-
spending regions argue that they are not receiving their fair share. They
believe these low-spending regions are penalized for providing more ef-
ficient care and because they receive lower reimbursement based on
Medicare’s payment formulas. Rural areas, in particular, have argued that
their low payment rates have made it difficult to attract physicians or
keep smaller hospitals afloat. On the other hand, urban areas typically do
have to pay higher prices for wages and rents—factors considered in de-
vising payment rates. High-spending regions generally have higher con-
centrations of teaching hospitals and poor residents, which increase ex-
penditures. And some higher-spending regions have residents in poorer
health who cost more to treat. Nonetheless, research shows that much of
the difference in spending is related more to physicians’ practice styles
and consumer expectations than to differences in beneficiaries’ health sta-
tus. Additionally, numerous studies suggest that substantially higher per
capita spending results in no positive difference in quality, access, or even
patient satisfaction with care.
Several proposals have been put forward to address these variations in
spending and payment. Both the House and Senate versions of the Medi-
care prescription drug bills would change the way Medicare pays hospi-
tals and physicians in rural areas, making their compensation more “equi-
table.” The Senate bill also contains provisions to establish demonstration
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projects that would, among other things, “reduce scientific uncertainty in
the delivery of care through the examination of variations in the utiliza-
tion and allocation of services.”2 Both public and private efforts seem to
be coalescing around a desire to “pay for performance,” where Medicare
(and private payers) could reward high-quality physician practices, hos-
pitals, and integrated health delivery systems that meet performance goals.
To assess the merits of these proposals, a better understanding of the un-
derlying reasons for these geographic variations seems warranted.
REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN MEDICARE:
AN OVERVIEW
Medicare spending per beneficiary varies tremendously across the na-
tion, with Miami and Santa Fe representing the highest and lowest, re-
spectively, at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. At the state
level, wide variations persist, from a low of $3,800 in Hawaii to as high as
$6,700 in Louisiana and $7,200 in the District of Columbia. In 2000 the
national average was $5,360 per beneficiary in the traditional fee-for-
service program.3
The demand for and delivery of different types of care also vary consid-
erably by geographic region. For example, the use of hospital services is
more prevalent in the Northeast than in the West. In addition, the use of
home health services differs significantly by area. In 1999 Medicare ben-
eficiaries in the South who used home health services received 54 visits,
on average, while beneficiaries in the Midwest received 32, on average.4
The use of skilled nursing facility and outpatient services also varies dra-
matically between regions.
Because Medicare payments for the same procedure often differ across
sites of care, where a service is performed can greatly affect how much it
costs. For example, payments for endoscopic procedures performed in a
physician’s office are significantly higher than payments for the same pro-
cedures done in a health care facility.5 In some areas of the country, it is
much more common to use an inpatient hospital setting to treat a par-
ticular condition than to use an outpatient setting such as an ambulatory
surgical center. These differences are reflected in cost and payment varia-
tions across the country.
In its most recent report to Congress, the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) concluded that about 40 percent of the variation
in per beneficiary Medicare spending is attributable to differences in health
status, input prices, and special payments to hospitals (for example, indi-
rect medical education payments). The remaining 60 percent of variation
results from differences in the quantity and mix of services used, due to





■ Miami, FL ....................... $9,200
■ New York, NY ................ $8,000
■ New Orleans, LA ........... $7,600
■ Fort Lauderdale, FL ....... $7,560
■ Philadelphia, PA ............ $7,200
■ Los Angeles, CA ............ $7,150
Lowest
Santa Fe, NM ...................... $3,500
Salem, OR ........................... $3,500
Sheboygan, WI ................... $3,700
Green Bay, WI .................... $3,700
Albuquerque, NM ............. $3,700
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services
Note: Based on metropolitan statistical areas.
Numbers are rounded.
4
NHPF Issue Brief No.792 / July 3, 2003
HEALTH STATUS
Numerous studies have documented that use of health services is strongly
related to health status. Data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey show that those who report fair or poor health status are much
more likely to be hospitalized and use outpatient and physician services
than beneficiaries in excellent or good health. The prevalence of serious
chronic conditions is greater among high-cost beneficiaries. A recent analy-
sis of Medicare spending found that, of the beneficiaries in the top 5 per-
cent of spending, 35 percent suffered from diabetes, 47 percent from con-
gestive heart failure, and 20 percent from cognitive impairment. In con-
trast, of beneficiaries in the bottom 40 percent of spending, 14 percent had
diabetes, 9 percent congestive heart failure, and 5 percent cognitive im-
pairment.7
State-to-state variation in the prevalence of chronic conditions has been
documented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).8
Socioeconomic factors (for example, age, education, employment status,
poverty), lifestyle behaviors (such as lack of physical activity, alcohol in-
take), and social environment (for example, educational and economic
opportunities) have been shown to be correlated with the prevalence of
chronic disease. A low level of education, for example, is highly corre-
lated with the prevalence of many health risk factors (such as lack of physi-
cal activity and cigarette smoking). Such interrelated variables make it
difficult to separate the effects of socioeconomic factors from health sta-
tus and indeed from geographic variations in general. Nonetheless, CDC
mortality rates show clear patterns in the outcomes of specific diseases in
certain states. For example, death rates from cardiovascular diseases are
disproportionately high in the southern states, while death rates from
colorectal cancer are higher in the Rust-Belt states.9
Health status differs between urban and rural populations as well.10 A
larger percentage of the rural population (13 percent) than the urban popu-
lation (9 percent) reports fair to poor health. Risky health behaviors seem
to be somewhat more common among adults in rural areas. For example,
rural residents are more likely to be overweight or obese and to abstain
from regular exercise. Within the Medicare program, rural beneficiaries
appear to have somewhat poorer health status, but this is not true in ev-
ery region in the country.11
PAYMENT POLICIES
A significant portion of geographic variation in Medicare spending re-
flects deliberate efforts by policymakers to allocate resources equitably.
On a nearly annual basis, Congress and the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) fine-tune Medicare’s administered pricing sys-
tem to meet specific policy goals. At times, the focus is on more evenly




 California ............................. 354
 Florida .................................. 366
 Iowa ...................................... 356
 Louisiana ............................. 470
 Massachusetts ..................... 368
 Minnesota ............................ 344
 Nevada ................................. 298
 New York ............................. 369
 Texas ..................................... 386
 Utah ...................................... 253
 United States ...................... 370
Source:  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Health Care Financing Review:
Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supple-
ment, 2001.
Amounts exclude managed care enrollment.
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others, policymakers seek to achieve alternative objectives, such as train-
ing physicians or improving access for poor or rural populations.
Input Price Adjustments
Medicare pays for services and products delivered by over one million
providers in hundreds of markets across the nation. Prior to 1984, Medi-
care paid providers on a cost basis, reimbursing hospitals and other fa-
cilities for their incurred costs and physicians for the charges they billed.
Today, under the traditional fee-for-service program, Medicare sets pre-
determined amounts for the majority of Medicare providers and for most
covered services.
The adoption of the inpatient prospective payment system (PPS) in 1984
represented Congress’ first attempt to pay equivalent prices and rates
across all regions for Medicare services. As a result of the Balanced Bud-
get Act of 1997 (BBA), prospective payment systems are now in place for
services furnished by rehabilitation facilities, skilled nursing facilities,
home health agencies, hospital outpatient department services, long-term-
care hospitals, and psychiatric hospitals. Under each PPS, Medicare sets
national base payment rates for each delivery setting, which represents
the amount Medicare would pay for an average unit of service in a mar-
ket with national average input prices.12 Recognizing that the costs of
providing care differ across geographic areas, Medicare’s payment sys-
tems adjust for local market conditions, using measures such as the area
wage index (for hospitals and other facilities) and geographic practice
cost indexes (for physicians).
Wage Index — Most Medicare prospective systems use a version of the
hospital wage index to account for geographic variation in labor costs.
The wage index compares the average hourly wage for hospital workers
in each MSA or statewide rural area against the national average. Medi-
care applies a wage index adjustment to a portion of the prospective pay-
ment system—raising payments in high-wage markets and lowering them
in low-wage markets—to account for differences among markets in the
wages providers must pay.
Medicare uses a classification system developed by the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) to define its geographic areas for the labor
cost adjustment.13 Each MSA is considered a single labor market and all
areas outside of metropolitan areas in each state are treated as a single
labor market. In general, hospitals in nonmetropolitan areas receive lower
Medicare payments because they pay lower wages.
A recent analysis by the General Accounting Office (GAO) determined
that the geographic areas used to define labor markets are too large in
many instances.14 There can be significant differences in average wages
across parts of nonmetropolitan areas of each state. For example, Medi-
care payments in 2001 for all hospitals in the nonmetropolitan area of
Washington were adjusted based on the average wage of $22.71 per hour.
Home Health Visits per
Person Served, Selected
States, 1999
 California ............................... 31
 Florida .................................... 43
 Iowa ........................................ 28
 Louisiana ............................... 96
 Massachusetts ....................... 50
 Minnesota .............................. 26
 Nevada ................................... 37
 New York ............................... 36
 Texas ....................................... 63
 Utah ........................................ 57
 United States ........................ 42
Source:  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Health Care Financing Review:
Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supple-
ment, 2001.
Amounts exclude managed care enrollment.
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Yet, nonmetropolitan hospitals in the western part of the state had aver-
age wages of $24.23 per hour, and wages in the central and eastern parts
of the state averaged $21.15 per hour, or 13 percent lower than hospitals
in the western part of the state.15
The wage index has been criticized by providers in low-wage areas as
being unfair and inaccurate. They argue that it does not appropriately
account for differences among areas in the types of workers employed. It
rewards, for example, hospitals that choose to use a greater percentage of
registered nurses. Congress has mandated the collection of occupation
mix data to address this issue in the future.
Under existing rules, hospitals, particularly ones located near the edge of
urban areas, continuously try to reclassify to higher-wage areas. Because
of budget neutrality requirements, geographic reclassification reduces
payments to hospitals that do not reclassify. Also, the payment formula
has been criticized for adjusting cost components that are not locally pur-
chased. Rural health care advocates, in particular, have argued that the
current share attributed to labor costs overstates the percentage of costs
that rural hospitals devote to wages and other locally purchased inputs.
MedPAC, on the other hand, has stated that the wage index overstates
the labor share in urban areas and that it is approximately correct in rural
areas.16 Several proposals pending in Congress would reduce the impor-
tance of the wage index in determining a hospital’s total Medicare reim-
bursement by lowering the current labor-related share from 71 percent to
62 percent. Some proposals would also create a wage index floor for the
areas with the very lowest wage indexes.
Geographic Practice Cost Indexes — Under Medicare’s physician fee
schedule, measures known as geographic practice cost indexes (GPCIs)
are used to adjust payment rates to reflect differences in the price of local
inputs. GPCIs have also been the subject of recent congressional scrutiny,
especially among members representing rural districts.
Medicare’s physician fee schedule, implemented in 1992, was designed
to slow growth in spending and to reduce wide discrepancies in pay-
ments between primary care physicians and specialists and among pro-
viders in different geographical areas. Under the fee schedule, each phy-
sician service (for example, surgery, office visit) is given a weight that
measures its relative cost. The weights, known as relative-value units,
have three components:
■ Physician work (time, skill, training).
■ Practice expense (rent, utilities, equipment, supplies, staff salaries).
■ Professional liability insurance expense.
There are three GPCIs—one corresponding to each component of the rela-
tive-value scale. To come up with the fee for a particular service code, the






 California ............................. 599
 Florida .................................. 625
 Iowa ...................................... 754
 Louisiana ............................. 700
 Massachusetts ..................... 779
 Minnesota ............................ 707
 Nevada ................................. 491
 New York ............................. 636
 Texas ..................................... 632
 Utah ...................................... 738
 United States ...................... 675
Source:  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Health Care Financing Review:
Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supple-
ment, 2001.
Amounts exclude managed care enrollment.
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The GPCI for physician work, in particular, has come under fire because
critics say the underlying data are outdated and flawed. The GPCI is based
on a sample of median hourly earnings of six professional categories (for
example, lawyers and engineers). Since some physicians earn most of their
income from Medicare, physician earnings are not used in the index be-
cause they would be affected by Medicare’s existing geographic adjust-
ments, according to GAO testimony.17
Congressional critics have declared that “physicians should not be com-
pensated for their time differently based on where they live.”18 Moreover,
physicians in rural areas argue that they are paid less than physicians in
more densely populated areas, even though it can cost as much or even
more to provide medical services in rural areas. Several proposals are
currently pending in Congress that would alter the GPCIs or establish a
floor for all localities.
However, analysts note that, by law, the physician work GPCI reflects
only 25 percent of the national variation in the earnings of professionals.
“If the work GPCI was based solely on the median earnings in each area,
physician payments would likely increase in large metropolitan areas and
decrease in rural areas,” according to GAO.19 Alternatively, if the physi-
cian work component were not adjusted for local conditions, payments
would increase in rural areas.
Special Payments to Hospitals — Medicare also makes special adjust-
ments to hospitals to compensate for costs associated with certain missions
beyond caring for individual patients. Because different regions of the coun-
try may have more or fewer of these types of hospitals, these special pay-
ments are reflected in the geographic variation in Medicare expenditures.
Teaching hospitals receive additional payments from Medicare to account
for costs associated with training medical residents. The size of the adjust-
ment depends on the hospital’s teaching intensity, as measured by the num-
ber of residents per bed. Hospitals that serve a disproportionate share (DSH)
of low-income Medicare and Medicaid patients also receive additional
Medicare payments. These DSH payments are intended to partially offset
revenue losses from furnishing uncompensated care. The DSH adjustment
is based on nine different formulas and depends on urban or rural location,
number of acute care beds, and other hospital characteristics.20
To preserve access in rural communities, significant health policy activity
has centered on Medicare payment of rural providers. Over the years,
Congress has enacted several policies that provide special payments to
certain types of rural hospitals, including the following:
■ Geographically reclassified hospitals.
■ Rural referral centers.
■ Sole community hospitals.
■ Small rural Medicare-dependent hospitals.
Skilled Nursing Facility
Users per 1,000 Medicare
Enrollees, Selected States,
1999
 California ............................... 48
 Florida .................................... 49
 Iowa ........................................ 51
 Louisiana ............................... 42
 Massachusetts ....................... 65
 Minnesota .............................. 54
 Nevada ................................... 30
 New York ............................... 37
 Texas ....................................... 43
 Utah ........................................ 45
 United States ........................ 45
Source:  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Health Care Financing Review:
Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supple-
ment, 2001.
Amounts exclude managed care enrollment.
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■ Critical access hospitals.
■ Swing beds.21
Proposals currently pending in Congress would further increase payments
to rural hospitals. Under the inpatient PPS, Medicare sets two standard-
ized payment amounts: one for large urban areas—MSAs with a popula-
tion of one million or more—and one for all other urban and rural areas.
Several legislative initiatives would raise the base payment rate for rural
and other urban areas to that of large urban areas. Other bills would help
hospitals with a small volume of Medicare discharges and increase Medi-
care DSH payments for rural hospitals.
Medicare+Choice
In many ways, the advent and eventual decline of the Medicare+Choice
(M+C) program made geographic differences in Medicare spending more
visible as a national issue. M+C payment rates have historically been
linked to fee-for-service spending at a county-specific level. Because of
wide variation in spending patterns, payment rates were also widely di-
vergent. As a result, Medicare beneficiaries who lived in high-payment
areas were offered plans with extra benefits (such as prescription drug
coverage) at little or no extra cost. But in low-payment areas, enrollees
had to pay substantial out-of-pocket costs for benefits beyond the basic
benefit package, if they were offered a managed care option at all.
In an effort to reduce inequities across counties, Congress, through the
BBA and subsequent legislation, changed the way M+C plans are paid.
To increase payments in low-expenditure areas (and attract managed care
to rural areas), the BBA established floor payments. Increases to plans in
high-expenditure areas were generally limited to 2 percent over the pre-
vious year’s rate.22 As a result, extra benefits offered in these areas have
been substantially reduced and enrollment in M+C plans has declined.
Despite payment changes designed to reduce the urban/rural disparity,
large discrepancies still exist between what Medicare beneficiaries in
urban areas and their rural counterparts can receive. In 2001 nearly 96
percent of beneficiaries living in a “center-city” county were being of-
fered at least one coordinated care plan under M+C, compared with
only 22 percent of those who live in nonmetropolitan areas. Prescription
drug benefits were also more readily available to urban beneficiaries, with
43 percent being offered an annual drug benefit of more than $1,000, com-
pared with only 3 percent of those residing in a nonmetropolitan, MSA-
adjacent county.23
The experience with M+C suggests that correcting the imbalance between
high-expenditure and low-expenditure regions is complicated and fraught
with unintended consequences. A variety of factors (such as reduced fee-
for-service spending and a managed care backlash) contributed to M+C’s




spending at a county-
specific level.
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increase managed care participation in underserved areas—has not been
achieved. Indeed, the program has faltered where it once thrived. As a
result, policymakers are left, once again, to grapple with the best way to
tackle geographic inequity.
SERVICE USE AND INTENSITY
While certain Medicare payment policies and differences in health status
among populations contribute to geographic variations in Medicare spend-
ing, most of the empirical research has concluded that these disparities
appear to be more related to service use and the intensity of care provided.
For over three decades, John Wennberg and colleagues at Dartmouth
Medical School have studied geographic variations in Medicare spend-
ing and disparities in clinical practice.24 Through their research, they have
documented remarkable differences in how Americans use health care
resources, as well as how the local supply of resources influences their
rates of use. In brief, the kind of health care a beneficiary receives can
depend very much on where the beneficiary happens to live.
The Dartmouth Atlas Project documents that Medicare spending varies
widely according to where seniors live, even after controlling for differ-
ences in age, sex, race, pricing differences, and health status. In its work,
the project highlights three categories of care:
■ Effective care—services of proven benefit that all patients with a
specific clinical indication should receive.
■ Preference-sensitive care—treatments with multiple options involv-
ing tradeoffs of risks and benefits, where patients’ preferences should
determine the choice of treatment.
■ Supply-sensitive services—everyday services such as physician
visits, the use of diagnostic tests, and the frequency of specialist consul-
tation and hospital stays.
Practice patterns differ extensively in the use of low-cost, effective care, as
well as in the use of expensive, preference-sensitive options. For example,
among heart attack patients whose conditions were ideally suited to the
administration of beta-blockers (inexpensive drugs used to prevent future
attacks), those who actually received the needed drug ranged from 5 per-
cent to 92 percent across many regions in the country. Preference-sensitive
treatments, such as cardiac bypass surgery, exhibit about a fourfold range
of variation, from three per thousand in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to more
than eleven per thousand in Redding, California.25
Variations in supply-sensitive services are particularly important because
(a) regional differences in spending are largely due to differences in the use
of these services; and (b) there has been remarkably little research on whether
higher use of such services (and thus greater spending) results in better




ies widely according to
where seniors live.
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services have been largely attributed to differences in the local supply of
these resources, according to the Dartmouth researchers.
One category of supply-sensitive services of great interest to seniors in-
volves the striking differences in what happens to Americans in the last
six months of life. On a per person basis, the average number of visits to
specialists range from 2 to 25 visits, and the number of days spent in the
hospital ranges from 4.6 to 21.4 days. In some parts of the country, nearly
50 percent of people die in the hospital, rather than at home or in a nurs-
ing home or community-based setting such as hospice. In these areas, the
likelihood of being admitted to an intensive care unit during the last six
months of life is also higher than average. In other parts of the country,
the likelihood of a hospitalized death is far smaller.
The frequency of use of everyday care, such as physician visits and diag-
nostic testing, also varies significantly across regions. A recent MedPAC
analysis of the use of physician services found that areas with the highest
service tend to be in the East, the South, and parts of a few states in the
West.26 Among the 50 largest MSAs, MedPAC found wide variation in the
use of services such as imaging and tests. Service use variation was low-
est for “major procedures,” which includes services such as coronary ar-
tery bypass grafts, knee replacements, and coronary angioplasties.
Quantity, Not Quality
A new comprehensive analysis published in the Annals of Internal Medi-
cine compares the quality of care and health outcomes of Medicare enroll-
ees treated in the lowest-spending regions with those treated in the high-
est-spending regions. The authors—led by Elliott Fisher of Dartmouth
Medical School—studied nearly one million Medicare enrollees who had
been hospitalized in the mid 1990s for a heart attack, hip fracture, or new
diagnosis of colorectal cancer, as well as a representative sample of the
elderly. The study, which adjusted for differences in price and illness lev-
els, had several key findings:
■ Residents of higher-spending regions received about 60 percent more
care than residents of lower-spending regions.
■ The additional services (and thus higher spending) were due to a more
inpatient-based and specialist-oriented pattern of practice (for example,
more frequent physician visits, greater use of specialists, greater use of
the hospital instead of the outpatient setting as a site of care).
■ Higher-spending regions had more hospital beds and physicians.
■ Quality of care (for example, provision of preventive services) was
slightly worse in higher-spending regions.
■ Health outcomes were no better or worse in the regions that pro-
vided more care.
The authors conclude that regional variations in Medicare utilization were
largely due to the more inpatient-based and specialist-oriented practice
Higher-spending re-
gions had more hospi-
tal beds and physicians.
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pattern associated with greater availability of these resources; that the
practice patterns in lower-spending regions of the United States were con-
sistent with excellent results; and that up to 30 percent of Medicare spend-
ing could be saved if all regions were to adopt the practice patterns of the
lower-spending regions.27
Another study that has attracted national attention, by Stephen F. Jencks,
M.D., and colleagues at CMS, ranks states according to performance on
22 quality indicators for care of Medicare beneficiaries in 2000–2001.28
These indicators “measure delivery of services that evidence shows to be
effective in preventing or treating breast cancer, diabetes, myocardial in-
farction, heart failure, pneumonia, and stroke.” While these indicators
are not perfect measures of quality, the preventive and treatment meth-
ods have been shown to improve outcomes. The Jencks study finds that
better performance was concentrated in northern states and less popu-
lous states (Figure 1).
A MedPAC analysis examined the relationship between Jencks’ quality of
care rankings and each state’s per beneficiary adjusted service use. Figure
2 sorts the states and the District of Columbia in order, from lowest ad-
justed service use to highest, as well as states with the lowest quality
rankings to the highest. Figure 2 “shows that many states with low ad-
justed service use have relatively high quality by this measure, and many
states with high adjusted service use have relatively low quality rankings.”29
FIGURE 1
State Rankings by Quality Indicators, 2000–2001
Source: Office of Clinical Standards and Quality, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.
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Patient Demand and Technological Change
Fisher and colleagues argue that a greater supply of resources results in
higher use of services. Whether a higher volume of services is associated
with better health outcomes, however, is still subject to considerable de-
bate. Some researchers have challenged the conclusion that higher utili-
zation is physician-induced and have argued that demand is driven by
the patients. Thus, high utilization causes higher supply. For example,
the large number of elderly residents with health problems in Florida has
attracted doctors and facilities to the area. Sicker patients do cost more,
and some analysts have argued that health status is not fully controlled
for in the Dartmouth analyses.30
The Fisher study’s analyses focus on regional variations at a single point
in time and do not address the possibility that technological advances—
while expensive—may be worth it. Prominent economists, such as Jo-
seph Newhouse, Mark McClellan, and David Cutler, argue that techno-
logical change is an important driver of growth in spending over time.
Treatment substitution and expansion due to new technology have con-
tributed to cost growth, but there is also evidence of better outcomes over
time, especially in the case of specific conditions such as heart attacks,
FIGURE 2
States’ Adjusted Service Use and Quality of Care, 2000
Source: MedPAC analysis of county-level fee-for-service expenditures and other data from Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services and Jencks et al., 2003.
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depression, and cataracts. Thus, in some cases, “the health benefits more
than justify the costs.”31 Cutler and McClellan caution that “policies that
eliminate waste and increase the incremental value of treatment may also
directly or indirectly retard technological progress.”32 Whether the differ-
ential application of beneficial technology explains geographic spending
patterns, however, is questionable.
POLICY OPTIONS
This wide variation in payment and services has emerged as a potent
political issue. Health care providers from low-spending states have or-
ganized to protest these apparent inequities in a national program. Their
main argument stems from the fact that Medicare beneficiaries pay the
same Part B premium, regardless of where they live, but there is substan-
tial geographic disparity in the volume and types of services delivered.
At the same time, reform-minded policymakers see this new awareness
of geographic variation as an opportunity to reduce excessive Medicare
spending and reward providers who practice evidence-based medicine.
Several policy options have emerged. Chief among them are initiatives to
increase funding to low-cost states; educate physicians about best prac-
tices; require more public reporting; pay for performance; and target high-
cost beneficiaries.
Increased Funding
Most proposals currently pending in Congress to address geographic
equity issues would equalize (that is, raise) Medicare payments to rural
hospitals and physicians. These proposals have been championed by in-
fluential senators such as Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa) and ranking member Max Baucus (D-Mont.), making
their inclusion in a broad Medicare reform bill highly likely.
Critics of this approach have warned that it may simply drive up Medicare
spending, without considering quality. Increasing payments in all markets
rewards inefficient, as well as efficient, health plans and providers.
Another approach, offered by the Iowa Hospital Association (and oth-
ers), would rank states on both cost per beneficiary and overall quality
measures (such as those used in the Jencks study). “Hospitals and physi-
cians in states that have the best combined scores would receive a five-
percent ‘add-on’ as a reward for outstanding performance,” according to
a proposal outlined in recent testimony at a Senate Finance Committee
field hearing.33
In its most recent report, MedPAC takes particular exception to propos-
als to address variation at the state level. First, MedPAC warns that “in-
creasing either the use of care or the prices Medicare pays for care in low-
use states would likely increase beneficiaries’ cost sharing.” Second,
Medicare beneficiaries
pay the same Part B pre-
mium, regardless of
where they live, but
there is substantial geo-
graphic disparity in the
volume and types of
services delivered.
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MedPAC cautions that the state “is not the best geographic unit for un-
derstanding variation in service use.”34 It notes that substantial variation
exists among counties within the same state. For example, in Iowa, per
beneficiary adjusted service use ranges from about 30 percent below to
about 25 percent above the state average. A similar result was found among
counties in New York. Thus, geographic variation would likely remain,
even if variation among states were eliminated. In addition, the most fre-
quently cited measures often confuse payments to providers with ser-
vices received by beneficiaries and do not account for beneficiaries going
across borders to receive care.
Physician Education
If physician practices are a big part of what drives variation, then why
not try to change physician behavior? Former president of the American
Medical Association, Nancy Dickey, who is currently president and vice
chancellor of the Texas A&M University System Health Science Center,
recently wrote that:
Changes in the current common processes in medical education will need
to be made in order to graduate physicians and other health care provid-
ers who are comfortable with and accustomed to using evidence-based
medicine in making intervention decisions....Incentives should be cre-
ated to encourage current clinical faculty to overtly utilize evidence-based
medicine in their teaching....[A]cademic health centers should lead the
inquiry regarding development and testing of hypotheses and the de-
sign and testing of remedies for unwarranted services.35
Most physician educators acknowledge that these changes must ultimately
come from within the physician community, not from health policy. None-
theless, payment incentives today do encourage high volume and inten-
sity. “This is not rocket science,” Robert Berenson, a medical doctor and
former CMS official, recently wrote. “[I]ncentives in basic payment policy
drives much of the behavior that becomes manifest in regional spending
variations....When Medicare pays relatively more generously for surgical
[diagnosis-related groups (DRGs)] than medical DRGs in relation to un-
derlying costs, the delivery system responds by producing more surgical
services.”36 Designing payment incentives to encourage efficient, evidence-
based care could go a long way toward changing physician behavior.
Public Reporting
Health care quality initiatives have for years encouraged public report-
ing of data as a way to steer people toward top-performing facilities. If
consumers choose certain providers based on quality information, the
theory goes, underachieving providers will have to improve to remain
competitive.
Medicare could require public quality and cost data reporting as a condi-
tion of participation. CMS has been moving aggressively in this direction.
Geographic variation
would likely remain,
even if variation among
states were eliminated.
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Through its “Nursing Home Compare” Web site, CMS now provides in-
formation about nursing homes (such as number of certified beds, type
of ownership, and deficiencies found during the last state inspection) and
about their residents (such as percentage with pressure sores or delirium).37
Across the country, CMS also sponsored newspaper ads that contained
comparative quality information on nursing homes. The initiative is de-
signed to help consumers make informed decisions among nursing homes
in their local areas. CMS also hopes to create market incentives for nurs-
ing homes to improve quality. The first phase of a similar initiative for
home health agencies was launched this spring in eight states.38 CMS has
similar beneficiary-oriented comparison tools, such as “Medicare Health
Plan Compare” and “Dialysis Facility Compare” available on its Web site
(www.medicare.gov).
Whether performance reports can truly move the market to encourage
high-quality, efficient care remains to be seen. Efforts to compare hospi-
tals, nursing homes, and health plans have been met with strong criti-
cism from industry officials, who assert that performance measures do
not adequately reflect severity-of-illness differences. Nevertheless, pub-
lic reporting has forced providers to come to the table to discuss the ap-
propriateness and reliability of performance measures. These measures,
in turn, begin to build a foundation for rewarding quality.
Pay for Performance
Rewarding quality in health care delivery has become the new mantra
for public and private purchasers alike. “Selective contracting,” “centers
of excellence,” and “paying for performance” are terms of art for a simi-
lar concept. Under this approach, providers would be evaluated and rec-
ognized for superior performance. Providers who were “doing it right”
could conceivably be rewarded with more patients and extra payments.
Purchasers (including Medicare) would pay providers differentially, based
on the achievement of specified performance targets, rather than uniformly
through a national formula.
Legislation that would establish Medicare demonstration programs to
test health delivery factors that encourage the delivery of improved qual-
ity in patient care was included in the Senate Medicare prescription drug
bill.39 Sponsored originally as S. 1148, the bill would support demonstra-
tion projects that encourage “the appropriate use of best practice guide-
lines by providers and services by beneficiaries,” and “reduced scientific
uncertainty in the delivery of care through the examination of variations
in the utilization and allocation of services, and outcomes measurement
and research.”40 In its most recent report to Congress, released June 15,
2003, MedPAC also recommended that the Secretary “conduct demon-
strations to evaluate provider payment differentials and structures that
reward and improve quality.”41
Public reporting has
forced providers to
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Jack Wennberg and his colleagues at Dartmouth have promoted the es-
tablishment of comprehensive centers for medical excellence (CCMEs).
To qualify, hospitals, provider networks, or organizations representing
regional coalitions would agree to establish best-practice, evidence-based
models. CCMEs would partner with the federal government to “bring
about fundamental improvements in the performance of the U.S. health
care industry” and reduce unwarranted variations.42 Medicare would
provide incentives to encourage beneficiaries to seek care from CCMEs.
Other proposals adopt this carrot approach by giving bonuses to health
care systems, health plans, or physician groups that achieve standards
defined at a national level. The stick method would establish provider
eligibility requirements governing who is allowed to receive Medicare
payments. For example, hospitals would be required to meet certain
performance goals as a condition of participation. Medicare could se-
lectively contract only with physicians who adhere to evidence-based
practice guidelines.
Innovative purchasers have been moving toward performance-based pay,
led by the efforts of the Leapfrog Group, a consortium of large private
and public health care purchasers. These purchasers have begun to col-
lect data that will enable them to reward providers who adopt the best
practices. However, they do acknowledge that this process is easier said
than done. Performance-based pay raises tricky design issues, such as
whether performance targets should be based on national or regional
benchmarks or provider-specific improvement. Also, veteran purchasers
warn that “one person’s variation is another’s person’s income.”43
Focus on High-Cost Beneficiaries
Disease and chronic-care management have also gained attention as an
alternative means to reduce Medicare spending. This approach maintains
that Medicare could target individuals with multiple chronic conditions,
better coordinate their care, encourage adherence to evidence-based treat-
ment guidelines, and thereby lower costs. Almost 32 percent of Medicare
beneficiaries have four or more chronic conditions and drive almost 79
percent of program spending.44 Thus, the potential gains in efficiency could
be quite significant. CMS has undertaken a series of demonstration projects
to test different care- and disease-management strategies.45 In addition,
both the House and Senate Medicare prescription drug bills contain pro-
visions to better coordinate care for beneficiaries with chronic conditions.46
A recent analysis by Dan Crippen, Steve Lieberman, and colleagues con-
siders the alternative approaches of targeting high-cost regions and target-
ing spending on high-cost individuals as a way to reduce Medicare spend-
ing. Crippen and Lieberman conclude that “a strategy centered on high-
cost individuals may hold the promise of greater ‘bang for the buck.’”47
While it would not address geographic disparities per se, it may reach
the same desired outcomes, in a way that is much less politically volatile.
Veteran purchasers warn
that “one person’s varia-
tion is another’s person’s
income.”
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Nonetheless, the authors acknowledge that focusing on high-cost indi-
viduals presents three major challenges: (a) identifying beneficiaries; (b)
developing and implementing effective interventions to improve out-
comes and quality of care; and (c) designing and implementing an appro-
priate payment system.
CONCLUSION
Policymakers have tried numerous ways to reduce variation in the Medi-
care program, from the adoption of the inpatient PPS in 1984 up to M+C
payment changes in 1997. Despite these efforts, many patterns of spending
and utilization have stayed consistent over time. Low-spending areas seem
determined to get their “fair share.” However, transferring dollars from
high-spending to low-spending regions would be politically explosive.
Most recently, public and private efforts seem to focus on changing in-
centives to reward quality rather than volume and intensity. Demonstra-
tion projects may afford the opportunity to test theories in an extremely
complicated health care delivery system.
Both the House and Senate Medicare reform proposals currently being
considered would divide the country into regions to receive prescription
drug benefits. Many lawmakers have raised concerns that benefits and
premiums could vary in different regions around the country, raising
important questions of equity. Thus, geographic differences in payment,
cost, and quality will surely intensify as the debate moves forward. To
achieve meaningful Medicare reform that enjoys widespread support,
these differences will need to be addressed in a reasoned manner.
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